Doctrine, Context, Institutional Relationships, and Commentary: The Malaise of Federal Indian Law through the Lens of Lone Wolf by Frickey, Philip P.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 38 
Issue 1 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock: One Hundred 
Years Later 
Fall 2002 
Doctrine, Context, Institutional Relationships, and Commentary: 
The Malaise of Federal Indian Law through the Lens of Lone Wolf 
Philip P. Frickey 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Philip P. Frickey, Doctrine, Context, Institutional Relationships, and Commentary: The Malaise of Federal 
Indian Law through the Lens of Lone Wolf, 38 Tulsa L. Rev. 5 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol38/iss1/16 
This Native American Symposia Articles is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
DOCTRINE, CONTEXT, INSTITUTIONAL
RELATIONSHIPS, AND COMMENTARY:
THE MALAISE OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
THROUGH THE LENS OF LONE WOLF
Philip P. Frickey*
I. INTRODUCTION: DRED AGAIN?1
20
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock' has been called "the Indians' Dred Scott decision. 3
Dred Scott is notorious because of its racism-its inhuman conceptualization of
African-Americans-and because of its troubling aftermath-it greased the slide
into the Civil War. Lone Wolf is similarly shocking. It, too, reeks of racism-its
treatment of Indians as subjugated, backward peoples under the unconstrained
rule of Congress-and had a troubling aftermath-the breakup of many Indian
reservations, the disintegration of many tribal governments, and the forced
assimilation of many Indians.
Most educated Americans have heard of Dred Scott. In contrast, only a
small segment even of the American legal community is aware of Lone Wolf. Of
course, this is why the comparison of Lone Wolf and Dred Scott is crafted the way
it is, and not the other way around. Although the comparable substance of Lone
Wolf and Dred Scott belie the common belief that federal Indian law involves
impenetrably dull and unimportant issues, the contrasting notoriety of the two
decisions reinforces the status of the field as a backwater of public law.4
* Richard W. Jennings Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall). Sarah
Krakoff, Judith Royster, and participants in a workshop at Boalt Hall provided valuable comments on
an earlier draft of this essay. I appreciate the indulgence of the Tulsa Law Review in allowing me to
reflect upon my earlier scholarship in federal Indian law within the context of this symposium.
1. With apologies to Chris Eisgruber. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dred Again: Originalism's
Forgotten Past, 10 Constitutional Commentary 37 (1993).
2. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
3. See Sioux Nation of Indians v. U.S., 601 F.2d 1157, 1173 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (Nichols, J., concurring)
("The day Lone Wolf was handed down, January 5, 1903, might be called one of the blackest days in
the history of the American Indian, the Indians' Dred Scott decision"), affd, sub nom. U.S. v. Sioux
Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980); Joseph William Singer, Well Settled?: The Increasing Weight of
History in American Indian Land Claims, 28 Ga. L. Rev. 481, 484 (1994). The reference is, of course,
to Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
4. One of the goals of my work is to suggest that "[f]ederal Indian law does not deserve its image
as a tiny backwater of law inhabited by impenetrably complex and dull issues." Philip P. Frickey,
Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law,
107 Harv. L. Rev. 381, 383 (1993).
1
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The Supreme Court in Lone Wolf attributed to Congress a "plenary
authority '5 over Indian affairs, including the capacity to break Indian treaties at its
discretion. In the treaty in question, the federal government had promised that no
further tribal land cessions would occur without the approval of a supermajority of
6the tribe. Congress ignored this provision and enacted a statute mandating the
7allotment of the Indian reservation. The Court refused to entertain any
complaint about this treatment,8 thereby solidifying the allotment program as a
cornerstone of federal Indian policy. Allotment remained the dominant federal
policy until it was formally abandoned in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
("IRA").9
Allotment attacked Indian tribalism root and branch.' ° In the allotment
statutes, the federal government unilaterally took tribal land and redistributed it in
parcels ("allotments") to be held in trust for a term of years by the federal
government for the benefit of tribal members." "Surplus" lands left over became
available for non-Indian settlement." The notion was that Indians should be
forced to leave their collective landholdings and homogeneous communal life.
During the period in which the allotments were in trust status, Indians were to be
groomed to become fee simple agriculturalists-yeoman farmers and ranchers of
Jeffersonian lore, small-time capitalists with individual stakes in the American
system. The assumption was that eventually the descendants of Indians and non-
Indian settlers would mix freely in a western melting pot. 3 Theodore Roosevelt
called allotment "a mighty pulverizing machine to break up the tribal mass. It acts
directly upon the family and the individual.' 4 My colleague Joe Sax has put it
more bluntly: "allotment was ethnic cleansing by eminent domain.
15
5. 187 U.S. at 565 ("Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by
Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be
controlled by the judicial department of the government.").
6. See id. at 564.
7. See id. at 568.
8. Id. ("as Congress possessed full power in the matter, the judiciary cannot question or inquire
into the motives which prompted the enactment of this legislation").
9. See Indian Reorganization Act, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479
(2000)).
10. See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 1 (1995) (providing a
description of the allotment process and a thorough examination of its contemporary consequences).
11. See e.g. Janet A. McDonnell, The Dispossession of the American Indian, 1887-1934, at 6-7 (Ind.
U. Press 1991).
12. See id. at 7.
13. See id. at 6-8.
14. Charles F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law: Native Societies in a Modern
Constitutional Democracy 19 (Yale U. Press 1987) (quoting S. Lyman Tyler, A History of Indian Policy
104 (Bureau of Indian Affairs 1973)).
15. Professor Sax made this remark when commenting on a draft of one of my earlier articles on
federal Indian law. In referring to "eminent domain," even this comment is optimistic. It was not until
1980, in the Sioux Nation decision discussed in the text infra, that the Supreme Court confirmed that
Congress could not confiscate tribal property without triggering the just-compensation requirement of
the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. See text accompanying infra notes 46-49. In Lone Wolf,
Congress had provided the tribe with some money for the surplus lands made available for non-Indian
[Vol. 38:5
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During the allotment era, Indians lost seventy percent of their lands.16 Some
of this land had been declared surplus and homesteaded by non-Indians, but much
of it was lost by even more unattractive means. When the allotments ripened into
fee simple, they became targets for opportunistic (and often fraudulent) non-
Indian land acquirers. Other parcels that became fee simple lands went through
tax foreclosures by local governments.
As noted, Congress did put a stop to further allotments by enacting the IRA
and decreeing that the parcels that remained in allotment format would stay in
trust in perpetuity.17 Congress did not attempt to undo other ongoing problems
with the program, however. Allotment has remained a cancer upon the landscape
of many reservations. Many allotted reservations have ended up today with a
dysfunctional checkerboard pattern of land ownership, with fee simple land (often
owned by nonmembers) scattered among Indian allotments and tribal land.'
Many of the parcels that have remained in the allotment format have passed by
intestate succession over the generations, so that now they are owned in fractional
shares by a multitude of persons. Over time, the management of such allotments
has, as a practical and statutory matter, become the domain of the federal
government, with the fractional owners receiving an occasional small check as the
only practical reminder of a program that was supposed to empower their
ancestors to become fee simple owners of the American dream. 9
The story of allotment vividly documents that Lone Wolf has two key facets.
First, it concerns the attribution of a dangerous, unchecked power to Congress,
authority that seems inconsistent with the rule of law. Second, it involved the use
of that power for misbegotten purposes with disastrous consequences.
Dred Scott controlled American race relations for only a brief period. Of
course I do not mean to suggest that the Civil War and the Reconstruction
Amendments have solved America's racial dilemma. My point is that, doctrinally,
no precedent is more derelict than Dred Scott. Moreover, when our legal system is
faulted for current dilemmas in race relations, the finger should be pointed not at
Dred Scott so much as at the failure to provide meaningful implementation to the
Reconstruction Amendments that relegated it to the dustbin.
Lone Wolf's story is more complicated. Its doctrinal embrace of colonialism
and its contextual aftermath-the ongoing devastations wrought by allotment-
continue to haunt federal Indian law and contribute to the sense that the field
settlement. Lone Wolf left unclear whether this compensation was a mere gratuity, and there was no
inquiry whether the payment was sufficiently adequate to constitute the "just compensation" required
by the Fifth Amendment.
16. See e.g. Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law 138 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds.,
Michie Co. 1982).
17. McDonnell, supra n. 11, at 115,121.
18. Id. at 121.
19. See Babbit v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997) (striking down congressional statute that recognized
this problem and attempted to ameliorate it by providing that small fractional shares in allotments
escheat to the tribe).
2002]
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remains perhaps the most dismal of all areas routinely visited by the Supreme
Court.2° Unlike Dred Scott, Lone Wolf provoked no constitutional amendment
reconstructing the federal policy on Indian affairs. Instead of such higher
lawmaking, a subtler shift in federal institutional responsibility has slowly
occurred.
In recent years, as explained below, the Supreme Court has attempted to
ameliorate some of Lone Wolf s doctrinal harshness. Had that been the extent of
it, the developments might have been an unalloyed progressive development in
federal Indian law. Unfortunately, the Court's entry into the field has not been
limited to providing review to congressional intrusions upon tribes. Instead, the
Court has gradually undertaken a broader role.2' It has been displacing the
primary congressional responsibility for Indian affairs with a judicial attempt to
address contemporary contextual dilemmas in federal Indian law on a case-by-case
basis. As I have argued elsewhere 22 and will elaborate further below, the Court
has performed this role quite poorly in recent years. It has produced incoherent
doctrinal compromises, jettisoned the longstanding institutional understandings in
the field in favor of an ill-defined judicial role, and destroyed practical incentives
for congressional and negotiated solutions to the myriad of invariably
differentiated local problems of tribal relations with states, local governments, and
nonmembers. Rather than moving the field toward sounder structural, normative,
and practical moorings, the Court has left the law in a mess, done little to promote
effective solutions to practical problems, and been more normatively concerned
about undermining tribal authority to protect nonmembers than about promoting
a viable framework for tribal flourishing in the twenty-first century.
In this essay, I use Lone Wolf as a window on these developments. This
symposium provides me the opportunity to reflect upon my scholarship as it may
illuminate Lone Wolf and the century of federal Indian law following it. In Part II,
I identify four objections to federal Indian law. Part III ties them to Lone Wolf
and the Court's role in the aftermath of that opinion. Part IV suggests some
conclusions that may follow from using these vantage points to examine federal
Indian law within the broader public law.
20. To reiterate my view of the subject:
If the "life of the law" for legal formalists is logic and for legal pragmatists is experience,
then federal Indian law is for neither. More than any other field of public law, federal Indian
law is characterized by doctrinal incoherence and doleful incidents. Its principles aggregate
into competing clusters of inconsistent norms, and its practical effect has been to legitimate
the colonization of this continent-the displacement of its native peoples-by the
descendants of Europeans.
Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal Indian Law,
110 Harv. L. Rev. 1754, 1754 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
21. See Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of
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II. FOUR OBJECTIONS TO FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
A. Normative and Substantive Problems
The first and most fundamental objection is normative and substantive. Put
simply and straightforwardly, federal Indian law concerns the legal doctrines
developed by colonizing Anglo-Americans to %accomplish the involuntary
displacement of the indigenous peoples of this continent. It involves a set of legal
rules developed not only to rationalize colonialism, but also to legitimate it. 3
These doctrines are contrary to the basic assumptions of our common law
tradition, which forbid nonconsensual deprivations of the fundamental interests of
those who have not through their fault contributed to the problems of others.
One way to imagine this inconsistency is to see federal Indian law and the
general federal public law as "layers of law," the latter constructed on top of the
former. Above the surface, where the general legal community operates, many of
us congratulate ourselves on creating a society with a Constitution that serves as a
model throughout the world by protecting individual autonomy from government
overreaching and by fostering a democratic resolution of social conflict. On the
surface, most of us believe-or would at least very much like to believe-that we
live in a society that generally respects the rule of law. Below the surface exists
federal Indian law, a set of doctrines imposed upon indigenous peoples to displace
them unilaterally, without fundamental legal protection for their ex ante interests
and without their meaningful participation in a democratic process. It is a nice
question whether the attractive "above the line" legal system could have been
constructed without the ugly layer underneath. Whatever might have been, it was
done the way it was done, and the underlying layer is so deeply rooted as to be
virtually invisible to both the general population and the larger legal community.
B. Practical Problems
Second is a practical objection. A common lament is that federal Indian law
is riddled with doctrinal inconsistency.24 Even Supreme Court Justices sometimes
admit that the law is a mess. 5 The few people who attempt to understand it are
23. See text accompanying infra notes 70-75.
24. For example, one recent summary quotes one scholar after another complaining that, "'[m]ore
than any other field of public law, federal Indian law is characterized by doctrinal incoherence,"' that
the Court has taken a "'bifurcated, if not fully schizophrenic, approach to tribal sovereignty,"' that the
Court has created "'an almost daunting set of inconsistencies,"' and even that the Court's work has
been "'a rudderless exercise in judicial subjectivism."' Blake A. Watson, The Thrust and Parry of
Federal Indian Law, 23 U. Dayton L. Rev. 437, 439-40 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
25. See e.g. Nev. v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 376 (2001) (Souter, Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., concurring)
("Petitioners are certainly correct that '[tlribal adjudicatory jurisdiction over nonmembers is... ill-
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often left in a muddled state. Tribal, federal, and state officials frequently have
little idea what the legal answer is to common practical problems.
Illustratively, some years ago I participated in a continuing legal education
program on federal Indian law. An attorney for the state of Minnesota provided a
wonderful example of this confusion and its practical effects. She mentioned that
she had been asked whether a county could apply its licensing and inspection laws
to a day-care facility operating on an Indian reservation in the county. A woman
ran the center in her own home. She was a member of the tribe, but her husband
was not. They owned the home on fee simple land on the reservation, a result of
the allotment process. Some of the children involved were tribal members, while
some were not. The attorney reported to the assembled audience that, based on
the current state of the law, she had no idea whether the county or the tribe had
regulatory authority. 6 As a practical matter, the county and the tribe both
decided to regulate. Rather than indulge in the costs of litigation, the woman
ultimately acquiesced in having two licenses, one from the county and one from
the tribe, and two sets of regulators periodically visiting her home. Obviously, this
is regulatory nonsense as a doctrinal and functional matter, which practical people
can only respond to by getting on with their lives as best they can.
C. Institutional Problems
Third is an institutional objection. In Lone Wolf, the Court ceded Congress
a plenary power over Indian affairs. As a practical matter, however, these days it
is the Supreme Court, not Congress, that, on a case-by-case basis, is constantly
readjusting the relations of the federal government, the states, tribes and their
members, and nontribal people who live in Indian country.27 The Court's
performance in Indian law has been subjected to withering criticism 8 Much of
this has related to the first two objections: the Court is more enthusiastic about
current colonial impulses than tribally sensitive commentators would like, and the
Court has not successfully managed the doctrinal aspects of federal Indian law,
leaving it in a state of incoherence. But there is another problem as well, rooted in
comparative institutional competence.
Congress has the capacity to operate on a local basis, attempting to find ways
to work with individual tribes, and with the states and counties that include their
reservations, to reach practical, functional resolutions of problems. Indeed, in the
ideal situation, the tribes and their state and county counterparts could negotiate
practical solutions on the ground without any federal involvement at all. In
26. At the time of the program, the primary precedent was Brendale v. Confederated Tribes &
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989). Even for federal Indian law, Brendale is a
remarkably muddled decision because the Court split into three nonmajority factions of four, three,
and two Justices each. The results in the case were governed by the swing votes of the two Justices,
Stevens and O'Connor, who concurred only in the judgments.
27. See Frickey, supra n. 21.
28. See e.g. David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States' Rights,
Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 267 (2001); Sarah Krakoff, Undoing
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contrast, the Court generally resolves cases based on- universal principles,
imposing one-size-fits-all "solutions" to problems that have a myriad of local
wrinkles. The supposed neutrality and generality of the rule of law are among its
most important beneficial aspects to our legal system as a whole, for they can at
least sometimes protect less powerful interests against selective abuse by
restraining the discretion of decisionmakers. In federal Indian law, however,
especially in recent years, the Court has not only failed to perform a checking
function upon congressional and state intrusions upon tribes, the Court has itself
enthusiastically imposed colonizing doctrines that undercut what remains of tribal
self-government.2 9  The Court has lost a sense that it is a guardian of tribal
interests as against congressional and state encroaching. ° Instead, the Court has
brought a variety of non-Indian-law values into play from the general public law
and is in the process of flattening the unique, tribal-protective aspects of federal
31Indian law by harmonizing the field with more generally applicable principles.
Decisional law is supposedly principled; negotiated outcomes by sovereigns
are inherently political. From an institutional standpoint, these days, at least,
federal Indian law is an area where the political seems preferable to the
principled.32
D. Academic Problems
Fourth, and certainly the most myopic and parochial, is an academic
objection. With federal Indian law in such a doleful state, commentators are hard-
pressed to make a meaningful contribution, or even to be energized to attempt to
do so. The law may be so fundamentally incoherent that sheer conceptual
reasoning and reformist proposals have little practical value. Moreover, reformist
rhetoric in support of tribes has a quixotic quality in the context of the current
Supreme Court.3  Furthermore, proposals for incremental doctrinal reform have
the uncomfortable quality of implicitly accepting much of the doctrinal status
quo.34 Most academics are much less qualified and not well situated to promote
what often seem to be the best outcomes, which are hands-on, practical negotiated
solutions on a localized basis.
29. See Frickey, supra n. 21, at 6.
30. Whether the Court ever performed this role well is subject to debate. See Wilkinson, supra n. 14
(presenting the optimistic view); Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 Am. B. Found.
Res. J. 1, 115 (1987) (presenting the pessimistic perspective).
31. See Frickey, supra n. 21, at 7; see generally Getches, supra n. 28.
32. See generally Frickey, supra n. 20.
33. As David Getches has demonstrated, the tribes have lost over three-fourths of their cases in the
Rehnquist Court. See Getches, supra n. 28, at 280.
34. See Robert B. Porter, The Meaning of Indigenous Nation Sovereignty, 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 75 (2002).
2002]
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The notion that "[c]ritique is all there is" is a respected (if controversial) idea
in the general public law,35 and some federal Indian law scholarship takes a related
tack. 36  For many academics, however, a relentlessly critical attitude may seem
unduly unworldly-too academic, if you will. In any event, once that has been
done, it is difficult to see what other scholarly contribution can be made, other
than perhaps the utopian one of imagining a world in which tribes exercised
serious sovereignty. Caught between a frequent sense of hopelessness on the
practical level and arguably unduly abstract critique on the conceptual level, my
sense is that at least some scholars (and some practitioners) in the field operate
within a psychological environment of bitter frustration and disappointment. Our
colleagues who work with Indian law clinics, where students are able to provide
practical help to tribes and their members, are more likely to feel efficacious and
rewarded by their involvement in the field.37
III. LONE WOLF REVISITED
The Court in Lone Wolf viewed Congress as having a special fiduciary
responsibility toward tribes and presumed that Congress would act in good faith in
Indian affairs,38 but saw no judicial role in second-guessing congressional acts in
35. See Mark V. Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law 318
(Harv. U. Press 1988).
36. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing
and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 219 (pathbreaking
criticism of federal Indian law from critical perspective).
37. The dichotomy drawn here between frustrated scholars and flourishing clinicians is a familiar
one in social justice circles, but it may be overdrawn in the context of federal Indian law. Many
scholars practiced in the field and continue to take an active role in practical affairs. Despite the trend
in Supreme Court decisions, in many respects tribal self-government continues to flourish, which
nurtures a will to carry on the work despite the frustrations tribes face in the federal courts. One major
piece that is missing in the law review writing is a narrative of success, which identifies the local
triumphs that arise in the field and demonstrates how more achievements along these lines can occur
within the confines of the current state of the law. Scholars need to educate the federal courts-as well
as ourselves-that tribal self-government can prosper in the twenty-first century in ways that are
efficacious and appropriate. Indeed, in my judgment, because public law is an inherently practical
enterprise, such a narrative of success that legitimates tribal governance in the eyes of the larger legal
community is more likely than grand scholarly theorizing to result in gradual doctrinal evolution
benefiting tribes. See Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic
Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 1137 (1990).
38. The Court made repeated references to this effect:
The [Indians' legal] contention . . . ignores the status of the contracting Indians and the
relation of dependency they bore and continue to bear towards the government of the
United States. To uphold the claim would be to adjudge that the indirect operation of the
treaty was to materially limit and qualify the controlling authority of Congress in respect to
the care and protection of the Indians ....
Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 564.
"It is to be presumed that in this matter the United States would be governed by such
considerations of justice as would control a Christian people in their treatment of an
ignorant and dependent race .. " Until the year 1871 the policy was pursued of dealing
with the Indian tribes by means of treaties, and, of course, a moral obligation rested upon
Congress to act in good faith in performing the stipulations entered into on its behalf. ...
The power exists to abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty, though presumably such
power will be exercised only when circumstances arise which will not only justify the
8
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the field. Lone Wolf provided that congressional authority "has always been
deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of
the government. 3 9 This understanding of the congressional and judicial roles in
Indian affairs has evolved since Lone Wolf in ways that illuminate the identified
problems in the field.
A. Lone Wolf and the Normative and Substantive Objections
Consider, first, Lone Wolf and its aftermath from the normative and
substantive perspective. It may well be the most starkly colonial opinion of the
Supreme Court. To be sure, in holding that Congress may unilaterally abrogate an
Indian treaty, the Court purported simply to be following the parallel rule of
international law embraced in the Chinese Exclusion Cases,4° whereby
international treaties were subject to congressional unilateral abrogation. The
differences are obvious, however.
Although a country may have the raw power under its domestic law to
breach an international treaty, consequences can flow under international law
from such a breach. In contrast, when Lone Wolf embraced the notion that
congressional abrogation of an Indian treaty is a political question unresolvable in
domestic courts, the Court left tribes without a remedy to prevent the abrogation
and without hope of retrospective relief for the consequences of the abrogation
unless they successfully beseeched the tender mercies of a later Congress. For the
Court had long viewed tribes as lacking sovereignty under international law,
instead possessing a unique, peculiar sort of status under domestic law. In Chief
Justice Marshall's famous phraseology, an Indian tribe is a "domestic dependent
nation," which is "in a state of pupilage" with a relation to the United States that
"resembles that of a ward to his guardian., 41 Thus, the denial of domestic judicial
government in disregarding the stipulations of the treaty, but may demand, in the interest of
the country and the Indians themselves, that it should do so.... [I]t was never doubted that
the power to abrogate existed in Congress, and that in a contingency such power might be
availed of from considerations of governmental policy, particularly if consistent with perfect
good faith towards the Indians.
Id. at 565-66 (citations omitted).
We must presume that Congress acted in perfect good faith in the dealings with the Indians
of which complaint is made, and that the legislative branch of the government exercised its
best judgment in the premises. In any event, as Congress possessed full power in the matter,
the judiciary cannot question or inquire into the motives which prompted the enactment of
this legislation.
Id. at 568.
39. Id. at 565.
40. Chae Chan Ping v. U.S., 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
41. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831), Chief Justice Marshall rejected the
argument that tribes were foreign states and suggested instead that they be "denominated domestic
dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will, which
must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a
state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian."
2002]
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relief meant that Congress itself was the only body from which the Indians could
seek redress. 2
In short, Lone Wolf saw indigenous peoples as the subjects of colonialism.
The tribal-federal relationship was one of subjugated sovereignty, where power
had displaced principle. The property of the tribe was subject to involuntary
federal distribution to the individual members free from legal constraint.
Congress had provided some compensation for the surplus lands unilaterally
severed and made available to non-Indians, but the Court in Lone Wolf left
43unclear whether that payment was merely gratuitous. No compensation of any
kind was available for the shattering of the geographical domain of tribal
authority, the forced encroachment of outsiders into the tribal community, or the
attempted imposition of western values upon individual tribal members.
B. Lone Wolf and Practical Objections: Doctrinal Incoherence, Contextual
Result-Orientation
What has emerged in the case law since Lone Wolf has been a muted effort
to blunt some of the harshest normative and substantive problems through
doctrinal evolution that has reinforced the second critique, that of the practical
perspective. In later cases, according to the Court, it has required that "Congress'
intention to abrogate Indian treaty rights be clear and plain., 44 According to the
canons of interpretation in federal Indian law, ambiguities in a congressional act
arguably inconsistent with a prior treaty are to be interpreted generously from the
tribal perspective to preserve pre-existing treaty rights.45
Moreover, no longer is congressional activity in Indian affairs a
nonjusticiable political question.46 Congress continues to have the authority to
abrogate Indian treaties and take tribal lands, but when it does the Court will
provide some review. If the congressional action is that of a good-faith trustee
toward its beneficiary, the Court will continue to defer; on the other hand, if the
act cannot be so characterized, it becomes one of eminent domain subject to the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.47
42. See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 568 ("If injury was occasioned, which we do not wish to be
understood as implying, by the use made by Congress of its power, relief must be sought by an appeal
to that body for redress and not to the courts.").
43. See id. at 568 (the statutes in question "purported to give an adequate consideration for the
surplus lands not allotted among the Indians or reserved for their benefit" and, in effect, perhaps
amounted to "a mere change in the form of investment of Indian tribal property," but, in any event,
because Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs, the Court considered these possibilities
nonjusticiable).
44. U.S. v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986).
45. See Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation:
"As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth "-How Long a Time Is That?, 63 Cal. L.
Rev. 601 (1975).
46. See Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 413-15; Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
47. See Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 408.
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This doctrinal backfilling provides a good example of the incoherence of
federal Indian law. It illustrates that when, as is often the case, the law begins with
a starkly colonial proposition that seems normatively dubious in a later era, the
Court will attempt to ameliorate some of the harshness through precedential
evolution while maintaining that it is ultimately the primary responsibility of
Congress to control Indian affairs. This is not a mixture likely to produce
doctrinal cogency, either normatively or descriptively. Consider three examples.
1. Tribal Property
A good illustration is the sui generis nature of most tribal property. Unlike
private property, the equitable title to the land constituting an Indian reservation
is ordinarily deemed to be held by the United States in trust for the tribe.48 The
United States, as trustee, continues to have the wide-ranging authority to manage
and transmute Indian property. As explained immediately above, the Takings
Clause kicks in only when congressional conduct cannot be defended as arguably
good-faith fiduciary behavior designed to give equivalent value. Congress can
take tribal lands and provide compensation, and, so long as it is arguably
adequate, that seems to be the end of the matter, and the Fifth Amendment
remains irrelevant. When Congress takes private lands, of course, the Fifth
Amendment is triggered automatically.
Thus, a normative compromise concerning tribal property was judicially
implemented through a spongy standard that requires courts to place a
dichotomous label (either good-faith trusteeship or bad-faith intermeddling) upon
the seemingly endless variation of what the federal government has actually done
with tribal property on a reservation-by-reservation basis. In place of the
doctrinal possibilities that would be easy for courts to apply-either forbid
congressional unilateral abrogation of Indian treaties protecting tribal property or
treat such disputes as raising political questions-normative compromise has
meant doctrinal muddling. Furthermore, the courts have never suggested that
equitable relief might be available to prevent the congressional taking of
indigenous lands. Thus, at most, the courts have made the legal treatment of
indigenous lands more similar to that of fee simple property. Finally, the courts
have assumed that indigenous lands are fungible with money, despite clear cultural
differences that often give unique spiritual and communal meanings to such lands
that make monetary compensation in return for their loss an inadequate
substitutionary remedy. 9
48. See Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, supra n. 16, at 472-73.
49. See Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 31, 80-82 (1996).
Indeed, the tribes that recovered over $100 million for the taking of the Black Hills in South Dakota
ultimately refused to take the money and are still holding out for the return of the area. Id. at 82.
Another example of an anomalous approach to property in federal Indian law that represents a
compromise of sorts is found in the cases concerning whether the United States may be sued for
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2. Reservation Boundaries
By breaking up tribal lands and distributing tribal property to members in
trust and to nonmembers in fee simple, the allotment process left undisturbed by
Lone Wolf did not specify what legal status remained of pre-existing reservation
boundaries. In its principal attempt at explicating a doctrinal approach to
resolving this dilemma, Solem v. Bartlett,50 the Court found itself already written
into a corner.
The Court in Solem began by explaining that the allotment statutes rarely
"detail whether opened lands retained reservation status or were divested of all
Indian interests."'" During the allotment era, it was assumed that reservation
status was coextensive only with Indian land ownership.52 These days, however,
the Court defines "Indian country," the domain of tribal authority, by reference to
a federal statute that includes within it "all land within the limits of any Indian
reservation .... notwithstanding the issuance of any patent., 53 Thus, the fact that
land was declared surplus, homesteaded by a non-Indian, and owned today by a
nonmember of the tribe would not, in itself, remove the land from reservation
status.
Two logical, if dichotomous, principles would seem to vie for application in
these circumstances.54 The first one would embrace the general canons of
interpretation in federal Indian law. As noted,55 the Court maintains that
congressional abrogation of an Indian treaty can be effectuated only by a clear
manifestation of congressional intent. It would seem inescapably to follow from
the application of this canon that the allotment statutes-which, by the Court's
hypothesis, did not mention reservation boundaries and were adopted without any
clear, articulated legislative statement on the subject-did not alter reservation
boundaries established by a pre-existing treaty. The second possibility would be
to abandon these canons because of the unique problems of allotment. By
bringing non-Indians into the tribal domain, allotment was designed to shatter the
geographical capacity for meaningful tribal sovereignty. Indeed, as discussed
earlier,56 a major purpose of allotment was to destroy collective Indian
landholding and assimilate individual tribal members into the American melting
pot. Maintaining pre-existing reservation boundaries runs directly contrary to
these congressional purposes. Thus, a purposive interpretation of the allotment
damages for mismanagement of Indian property held in trust by the United States. See U.S. v. Mitchell,
463 U.S. 206 (1983); U.S. v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
50. 465 U.S. 463 (1984).
51. Id. at 468.
52. Id.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000). This statute only squarely governs federal criminal jurisdiction, but the
Court has borrowed its definitions to resolve questions of civil jurisdiction as well. See DeCoteau v.
Dist. County Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 428 n. 2 (1975).
54. Here I borrow from Frickey, supra n. 21, at 17-27.
55. See text accompanying supra note 44.
56. See text accompanying supra note 14.
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statutes would seem to compel the conclusion that outright disestablishment of the
reservation, or at least its diminishment so that it encompassed only the Indian
lands that survived allotment, occurred in every instance.
Solem acknowledged the doctrinal force of the canonical approach57 and
denied that the purposive alternative had precedential validity.58 Nonetheless, the
Court found itself unable to reach the logical conclusion, which would have
generally maintained reservation boundaries despite allotment. The reason was
that in four earlier cases the Court had split on the ultimate question, twice finding
diminishment 59 and twice holding reservations intact.60 The Court in Solem
gamely tried to find distinguishing principles explaining the logical consistency of
these results. 6' As demonstrated elsewhere," however, the only substantial factor
driving the precedents has been the current demographics of the area. Indeed,
although the Court in Solem could not bring itself fully to admit the stark legal
realism at work, it did acknowledge the role played in the precedents by
"subsequent demographic history," which it referred to as a "necessary
expedient., 63  The discussion is so self-consciously tortured that it is painful to
read.64
57. See 465 U.S. at 468 ("Diminishment... will not be lightly inferred. Our analysis of surplus land
acts requires that Congress clearly evince an 'intent to change boundaries' before diminishment will be
found.") (quoting Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 615 (1977)).
58. See id. at 468-69 ("Although the Congresses that passed the surplus land acts anticipated the
imminent demise of the reservation and, in fact, passed the acts partially to facilitate the process, we
have never been willing to extrapolate from this expectation a specific congressional purpose of
diminishing reservations with the passage of every surplus land act.").
59. See Rosebud Sioux, 430 U.S. at 587; DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 445.
60. See Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973); Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
61. See Frickey, supra n. 21, at 17-21.
62. Id. at 20, 20 n. 99 (citing Robert Laurence, The Dominant Society's Judicial Reluctance to Allow
Tribal Civil Law to Apply to Non-Indians: Reservation Diminishment, Modern Demography and the
Indian Civil Rights Act, 30 U. Rich. L. Rev. 781 (1996), and James M. Grijalva et al., Diminishment of
Indian Reservations: Legislative or Judicial Fiat?, 71 N.D. L. Rev. 415 (1995)).
63. 465 U.S. at 472 n. 13.
64. The Court's discussion began as follows:
On a more pragmatic level, we have recognized that who actually moved onto opened
reservation lands is also relevant to deciding whether a surplus land act diminished a
reservation. Where non-Indian settlers flooded into the opened portion of a reservation and
the area has long since lost its Indian character, we have acknowledged that de facto, if not
dejure, diminishment may have occurred.
Id. at 471 (citations omitted). The Court then referred to "the obvious practical advantages of
acquiescing to de facto diminishment," id., which it explained this way:
When an area is predominately populated by non-Indians with only a few surviving pockets
of Indian allotments, finding that the land remains Indian country seriously burdens the
administration of State and local governments. Conversely, problems of an imbalanced
checkerboard jurisdiction arise if a largely Indian opened area is found to be outside Indian
country.
Id. at 472 n. 12 (citations omitted). The Court also stated that "we look to the subsequent demographic
history of opened lands as one additional clue as to what Congress expected would happen once land
on a particular reservation was opened to non-Indian settlers." Id. at 471-72. Presumably because
clairvoyance is not one of Congress's strong suits, the Court then dropped a footnote: "Resort to
subsequent demographic history is, of course, an unorthodox and potentially unreliable method of
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The Court in Solem deserves credit for trying, but it could not successfully
mediate century-old colonial policies with more normatively attractive interpretive
principles without overruling precedent, which in federal Indian law the Court has
been remarkably resistant to do.65 To be sure, the Court also did not capitulate
entirely to original congressional goals, as it would have had it followed the
purposive approach. The Court was willing to buttress contemporary tribal
sovereignty-and thwart the interests of nonmembers to be free from potential
tribal regulation-but only when the opened areas of the reservation had not "lost
their Indian character, ''66 as Solem put it.
Thus, as is the case with the judicial protection of Indian property from
congressional appropriation, the Court in the diminishment scenario has ended up
with a compromise in which the application of a generally applicable legal
principle is abandoned in favor of a case-by-case contextual inquiry. Each
examination is rooted in factual questions: Did Congress act as a good-faith
trustee or a confiscating sovereign? Has a reservation area "lost its Indian
character"? These questions demand a yes or no answer when the reality will be a
continuum of extremely difficult, culturally skewed judgment calls. After all, can
federal judges really be expected to find an adequately objectively valid, cross-
cultural answer to the question whether land has retained "Indian character," or
whether Congress's behavior many years ago, in times long since lost and under
pressures long since relieved, looks to contemporary eyes as mostly fiduciary or
mostly confiscatory? In recent years, this approach has played out about the way
one would expect. The Rehnquist Court, which has generally been unreceptive to
tribal claims, 67 has continued to find diminishment in circumstances that the
Justices think would make tribal authority over nonmembers problematic even
though the better doctrinal arguments supported maintaining original reservation
boundaries.68
3. Tribal Authority over Nonmembers
As a final example of post-Lone Wolf muddling, consider the cases involving
whether tribes may regulate nonmembers found in Indian country-that is, within
the tribal geographical domain notwithstanding the diminishment cases. These
decisions have emerged as the most important work of the Court in federal Indian
statutory interpretation. However, in the area of surplus land acts, where various factors kept
Congress from focusing on the diminishment issue.... the technique is a necessary expedient." Id. at
472 n. 13. Obviously, if either the clear-statement canon or the purposive approach were applied, no
"expedient" would be necessary. What impels the expedient is the dual power of precedent and
context, with logic and doctrinal coherence falling by the wayside.
65. See Philip P. Frickey, Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Federal Indian Law, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1199,
1213 n. 95 (1989).
66. Solem, 465 U.S. at 480.
67. See supra n. 33.
68. In the two cases since Solem, the Rehnquist Court has found diminishment both times. See S.D.
v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994). See Frickey, supra n.
21, at 22-24 (giving reasons why these decisions are doctrinally dubious).
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law in recent years and provide the most vivid examples of the normative,
doctrinal, practical, institutional, and academic problems in the field.
Although they have been extensively examined,69 for present purposes it
seems impossible to be succinct. The issues are explicable only by an examination
of the federal common law background concerning the extent to which inherent,
pre-existing tribal authority is tempered by colonial pretensions and then by an
excursion through the many recent precedents.
In 1823, in the first major precedent in federal Indian law, Johnson v.
McIntosh, ° Chief Justice Marshall conceptualized the American colonial process
as follows: Before contact with Europeans, Indian tribes were sovereign unto
themselves." European contact resulted in two major divestments of inherent,
pre-existing Indian interests: the European sovereign that "discovered" a tribal
region now possessed the bare legal title to that tribe's lands, and the tribe was
locked into a sovereign-to-sovereign relationship with that European government,
such that the former could have treaty relations with no country other than the
latter." Tribes retained equitable title to their lands (in effect, a possessory
interest), good against the encroachment of third parties.73 Only the European
sovereign-not private interests or other countries-could acquire the tribal title
and merge it with the European-held legal title to create fee simple interests.74 In
the 1823 decision, Marshall wrote, in dictum, that the European sovereign could
obtain the tribal land estate "by purchase or by conquest, 75 but in short order he
acknowledged the legitimacy of consensual arrangements alone.76
These understandings obviously presage Lone Wolf's attribution to Congress
of a plenary power over Indian affairs. They left unclear whether "plenary" meant
absolute (as with the conquest idea) or simply complete and preemptive of any
competing Anglo-American legislative authority (such that states could not have
sovereign relations with tribes, but that Congress's authority concerning Indian
affairs might be limited by some legal constraints). Under either understanding of
"plenary," however, as a matter of federal common law, tribes retained inherent
sovereignty except with respect to land transfers and government relations. It was
69. See e.g. N. Bruce Duthu & Dean B. Suagee, Supreme Court Strikes Two More Blows against
Tribal Self-Determination, 16 Nat. Resources & Envtl. 118 (Fall 2001); Frickey, supra n. 21; Getches,
supra n. 28; Krakoff, supra n. 28; Alexander Tallchief Skibine, Making Sense Out of Nevada v. Hicks: A
Reinterpretation, 14 St. Thomas L. Rev. 347 (2001).
70. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 573-74.
73. Id. at 574.
74. Id. at 592-93.
75. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 587.
76. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17 ("the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and,
heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by a
voluntary cession to our government").
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the responsibility of Congress as successor to the European sovereigns, and not of
the courts, to implement the ongoing colonial process.
In short order, Chief Justice Marshall invoked the federal judicial power to
safeguard this understanding of tribal authority. In Worcester v. Georgia,77
Marshall sought to entrench two essential protective elements into federal Indian
law. The first, a modification of ordinary American federalism, understood states
to have no authority to impose law unilaterally upon Indian reservations and the
persons found on them.78 The second amounted to an aggressive application of
what have come to be understood as the canons of interpretation of federal Indian
law.79 Marshall interpreted a treaty between the federal government and a tribe
protectively, so that the tribe had not ceded away any authority unless the treaty
80included a clear statement to that effect. In later cases, the Court applied the
canons to require that unilateral congressional intrusions upon tribal sovereignty
also had legal effect only if they were clear.8'
Thus, it would seem elementary that, except for the land title and
treatymaking limitations recognized in Johnson, tribes retained all aspects of
inherent sovereignty not divested by Congress or ceded away consensually. The
judicial role was a structural one-to safeguard tribal interests as against all but
clear losses, but to leave Congress ultimate control of the colonial process-rather
than a common law one, which would have instead foisted upon the courts the
difficult role of case-by-case development of principles of colonialism appropriate
for the evolving social context.
This basic understanding of the nature of federal Indian law remained in
place for many years. In his famous treatise on the field published in the 1940s,
Felix Cohen thoughtfully explained and elaborated upon this conception."' This
vision also captured the practical reality of the Court/Congress interaction in
federal Indian law. For example, nearly contemporaneously with Lone Wolf s
attribution of a plenary authority over Indian affairs to Congress, the Court had
the opportunity to begin to develop, on a case-by-case basis, judicially defined
limitations upon tribal authority when Congress had not exercised its plenary
power to impose such limitations. Consistent with the model developed above,
the Court refused to embark on this common law process, instead invoking the
structural, political-question-like nature of the field. In Talton v. Mayes,83 it held
that tribal authority over members was rooted in inherent tribal sovereignty that
predated the Constitution and that was not bound by constitutional limitations
upon government power. Many years later, Congress, operating on this
77. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
78. Id. at 561.
79. On the canons, see Wilkinson & Volkman, supra n. 45; Dion, 476 U.S. at 738. See Frickey, supra
n. 4 (my understanding of Marshall's interpretive model).
80. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 552-54.
81. See e.g. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); Frickey, supra n. 4, at 429-32.
82. See Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 37, 122-23 (GPO 1942).
83. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
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understanding, adopted the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 ("ICRA"),14 which
applies to tribal governments by statute many of the limitations imposed on the
federal and state governments by the Constitution. Tellingly, in this exercise of
congressional plenary power, Congress advertently drafted the statute extending
the Constitution to Indian country to protect "any person," not simply Indians,
from tribal authority.
85
In a nutshell, then, the extent of tribal authority would seem to be defined by
the following equation: (1) full, inherent sovereignty (prior to European contact),
minus (2) judicially defined limits on land transactions and treaty relations, which
may take place only with the United States as successor to the discovering
European sovereigns (Johnson), minus (3) voluntary cessions of tribal authority
(subject to the clear-statement canon protecting against inadvertent losses of
power), minus (4) abrogations of tribal power by Congress (again, subject to the
86
clear-statement canon), such as ICRA. Under this formulation, it would follow
that a tribe's inherent authority to impose criminal and civil regulation upon all
persons found in the tribe's geographical domain (category 1) is unaffected by
category 2 and is retained today unless the tribe clearly ceded away this authority
(category 3) or Congress has clearly altered or abolished it (category 4).
We can now, finally, return to the question posed in this section concerning
the extent of tribal authority over nonmembers found in Indian country. Because
ICRA does not purport to abolish tribal geographical jurisdiction over any set of
persons, but instead simply imposes some constitutionally analogous limitations
upon that power when applied to "any person," it would seem quite clear that,
unless a tribe has entered into a treaty or agreement to the contrary, the tribe
retains geographical criminal and civil jurisdiction over any person, subject to
ICRA's protection of individual rights.
Alas, when this understanding was put to the test, it arose in a case
presenting a context in which the Court could not abide it. The context was a
particularly devastating aftermath of allotment, the process sanctioned by Lone
Wolf.
In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,87 a non-Indian who resided on the
reservation assaulted a tribal police officer. It was a miserable test case for
asserting tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, because only about fifty
tribal members and almost 3,000 non-Indians lived on the reservation in
84. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000).
85. See Frickey, supra n. 37, at 1162-63.
86. In actuality, one more category exists, which although irrelevant to the current conversation
should be mentioned. Congress is authorized to delegate authority to tribes. See U. S. v. Mazurie, 419
U.S. 544 (1975). On the difficulty in distinguishing a federal statute that delegates federal power to a
tribe from a federal statute removing the preemptive force of federal law so that inherent tribal
authority may be executed, see infra note 149.
87. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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question. 88 This shattering of the tribal domain, which was the result of allotment,
was unremarked upon by the Court save for an off-hand footnote near the
beginning of the opinion. Instead of denying this tribe jurisdiction because of the
dreadful circumstances, the Court announced a general rule: tribes lack criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians. 89 Congress had never divested this tribe of that
authority, however, nor had the tribe ceded it away. Accordingly, to deny tribal
jurisdiction, the Court was forced to take the 150-year-old lid off category 2 above
and aggrandize to itself the theretofore unknown judicial common law power of
limiting tribal authority on a case-by-case basis.
The cases following Oliphant have taken the Court's predictable pattern of
muddling to a new extreme. As in Oliphant, many of these developments can be
traced to the contemporary problems flowing from the allotment process
sanctioned by Lone Wolf.
In the first important case following Oliphant, Montana v. United States,90 the
Court held that a tribe could not regulate nonmember hunting and fishing on
nonmember fee lands found on an Indian reservation. The Court clearly assumed
that the tribe could regulate such activity on Indian lands, however. 9 Thus, the
allotment process again had the practical effect of diminishing tribal authority on a
case-by-case, contextual basis. Indeed, unlike in Oliphant, the Court attempted to
be especially contextually sensitive, in that it stated that although the assertion of
tribal authority over nonmember lands was presumptively invalid, it could be
defended if the nonmember had consented or if the nonmember activity
92threatened a significant tribal interest.
In a later case involving another allotted reservation, Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,93 the Court, with no
operative majority at work, held that the tribe could zone nonmember fee land
found within the closed area of the reservation (where virtually all land was
Indian) but could not zone nonmember fee land found in the opened area of the
reservation (where most of the land was non-Indian). That result appears
88. Id. at 193 n. 1.
89. Id. at 208.
90. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
91. See id. at 557 ("The Court of Appeals held that the Tribe may prohibit nonmembers from
hunting or fishing on land belonging to the Tribe or held by the United States in trust for the Tribe, and
with this holding we can readily agree.") (citations omitted).
92. The Court stated:
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe
may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who
enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing,
contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise
civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that
conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security,
or the health or welfare of the tribe.
Id. at 565-66 (citations omitted).
93. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
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consistent with the inquiry driving the outcomes in the diminishment cases-
whether the land has retained its Indian character 4-but seems hopelessly ad hoc
and immune to principled application. Moreover, the Court in Brendale seemed
unsure what to make of Montana as a precedent, and none of the three opinions in
the case purported to be a straightforward application of Montana to the facts.95
Allotment did not 'reach all reservations, however, including several that
provided the context for post-Oliphant Supreme Court cases. Moreover, as the
common law hydraulically attempts to do, the Court has sometimes gamely tried
to articulate more general principles concerning tribal authority over nonmembers
that transcend litigative context.
As already suggested, Oliphant provides one example of the chaotic
relationship between context and principle in these cases. The Court there was
surely driven mostly by the weak contextual argument for tribal jurisdiction, yet
stated its rule forbidding tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians as a
universal proposition, not one limited to tribes that have suffered the devastation
of allotment and the influx of nonmembers holding fee simple lands. Although its
reasoning is not a paragon of transparency, Oliphant seems to have held that tribes
universally lost this jurisdiction when the United States generally asserted
supervening authority over them, not on a tribe-by-tribe basis as the result of
96allotment or other congressional intrusions.
As a historical and contextual matter, this understanding seems absurd. To
be sure, under the precedential framework articulated above, category 2-federal
common law limitations upon tribal power as the result of European contact-was
the only avenue that the Court could open on its own authority in support of its
conclusion. Yet it seemingly could have invoked category 3-diminishment of
tribal authority through congressional lawmaking-and held that, when Congress
opens a reservation for allotment and the process devastates the practical tribal
capacity to regulate nonmembers, Congress has clearly (if implicitly) divested the
tribe of that authority. Of course, while this tack would have been truer to the
later approaches taken in Montana and Brendale, it would have been inconsistent
with the canons of interpretation, for nowhere can be found a federal statute that
clearly works this jurisdictional limitation. Nonetheless, the outcome would have
been similar to those in the diminishment cases, where as a practical matter the
canons have fallen by the wayside and the Court understands allotment to create
demographical dilemmas that are to be solved on an ad hoc basis depending upon
whether the region in question has retained its Indian character. Unlike the
diminishment cases, however, where the Court had written itself into a corner
when it finally attempted to articulate some general reconciling principles,
94. For additional information, review the text accompanying supra notes 59-68.
95. See Frickey, supra n. 21, at 44-45 (for fuller examination of Brendale).
96. For elaboration, see Frickey, supra n. 21, at 36.
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Oliphant, Montana, and Brendale seem to create the opposite problem, leaving
later courts with no directional markers for determining which of several radically
different and under-theorized paths should be taken.
It may seem impossible, but later cases only made things worse. Some years
after Oliphant, the Court returned to the path of generalized principle when it
held, in Duro v. Reina,97 that tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over all nonmembers,
including nonmember Indians, not simply over non-Indians, on all reservations,
whether allotted or not. Why tribal criminal jurisdiction is amenable to general
principles but civil jurisdiction is subject to ad hoc contextual inquiries was no
more explained in Duro than it had been in earlier cases.98
Indeed, the muddling is deeper than merely a criminal/civil divide. For in an
early civil regulatory case, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,99 the Court upheld
tribal authority to impose a severance tax upon the extraction of oil and gas from
tribal lands on an unallotted reservation by a non-Indian company. Merrion did
not focus on context-instead, like Oliphant, but unlike Montana, Merrion
articulated general principles of federal common law under which tribal taxation
authority seemed geographical in scope. 1° Indeed, Merrion never even cited
Montana, much less attempted to distinguish it. Thus, in the area of civil
regulatory jurisdiction, the precedents left later courts with two paths-ad hoc
contextual outcomes or generalized common law principles embracing or denying
tribal authority on a widespread basis-and little guidance for channeling later
disputes along one or the other.
More recently, in Atkinson Trading Company v. Shirley,'°  the Court, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, cut back on the implications of Merrion by
denying tribal authority to tax nonmember activities on fee land. The case, which
involved the tribe's attempt to tax nonmember occupancy of rooms at a
nonmember-owned hotel, vividly demonstrates the chaotic quality of Indian law
precedent. Atkinson Trading Company is arguably consistent with Montana (in
treating nonmember land as presumptively immune from tribal regulation). It is
97. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
98. To be sure, the Court stressed that criminal jurisdiction was "a far more direct intrusion on
personal liberties," id. at 688, but in precedential context this seems dubious. Because of ICRA, the
tribe had little sanctioning authority and was clearly bound to follow most guarantees of fair criminal
procedure, with habeas corpus relief available if the tribal proceeding defaulted on these obligations.
See 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2000). In contrast, in the cases involving the civil jurisdiction of tribal courts over
nonmember defendants assessed below, as well as in the cases in which tribes assert civil regulatory
power over nonmembers, such as Montana, ICRA provides no federal avenue for relief from a tribal
court judgment. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (only federally enforceable
remedy under ICRA is habeas corpus).
99. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
100. The Court stated that "there is a significant territorial component to tribal power," id. at 142,
and that "Itihe power to tax is an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary
instrument of self-government and territorial management." Id. at 137. Left unexplained was why
criminal jurisdiction (Oliphant) and basic civil police-power regulation like hunting and fishing rules
(Montana) fail to quality under this approach.
101. 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
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also arguably inconsistent with Montana, which dealt with an allotted reservation
with nonmember fee land interspersed with tribal land and Indian allotments,
because the nonmember fee land in Atkinson Trading Company was isolated and
surrounded by an Indian domain. Thus, arguably, the closer precedent was
Brendale's holding that the tribe in that case could zone the nonmember land
isolated in a largely pristine Indian area. Indeed, the controlling opinion in
Brendale contained language strongly supporting such a contextual approach to
tribal authority.'02 Moreover, recall that even though Merrion dealt with tribal
taxation of nonmember activities on tribal land, that precedent contained language
strongly suggesting that tribal taxation authority was geographical in sweep and
did not depend upon who owned the land in question. 103 Thus, Atkinson Trading
Company is arguably inconsistent with Merrion when that precedent is understood
for what it was, an attempt to articulate general common law principles rather
than simply resolve a fact-bound dispute.
The relationship between general principles and context is further muddied
in Atkinson Trading Company because, unlike in his majority opinion in Oliphant,
Chief Justice Rehnquist chose to emphasize contextual factors supposedly
favoring freedom of the non-Indian operation from tribal regulation. According
to his opinion, the trading post and hotel in question serve almost exclusively non-
Indian customers who happen to be traveling by them simply because they are
located on a major thoroughfare for tourists visiting the Grand Canyon. 1°4 The
impression is that the business obtains few benefits from its reservation location.
In the rare instance when it might use tribal public services (e.g., police or fire
protection), the Court suggested that the tribal interest could be accommodated
on a fee-for-use basis.1°5 But this picture of a non-Indian business merely
coincidentally located in Indian country and partaking of no benefits from the
surrounding domain is radically inconsistent with Atkinson Trading Company's
own website,'10 6 which portrays itself as an attractive stop for non-Indian tourists
because of its reservation location and its native merchandise.0 7 From this
different contextual vantage point, when the Court in Atkinson Trading Company
immunized this business from tribal taxation authority, it allowed the business to
free-ride on its reservation location. As with the reservation diminishment cases,
the Court seems to be interested in whether non-Indians are in an area that has
retained its Indian character-without any sort of criteria to make this assessment
102. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 438-44 (Stevens, J., joined by O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
103. See supra n. 100.
104. See Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 648.
105. See id. at 655.
106. Cameron Trading Post, <http://www.camerontradingpost.com/> (accessed Oct. 13, 2002).
107. In addition, Sarah Krakoff has pointed out to me that, by being on the reservation, the trading
post has a readily available labor pool and need not provide housing for its workers, as do
concessionaires at the south rim of the Grand Canyon.
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free from cultural myopia and in a way that might be generalized beyond ad hoc
judgments.
Much along similar lines could also be said about the Court's decisions
involving tribal court jurisdiction over nonmembers in civil cases. In a pre-
Oliphant case, Williams v. Lee,'08 the Court held that state courts could not
entertain a collection action brought by a reservation-based non-Indian company
that had sold goods to reservation-residing tribal members. The decision,
consistent with Chief Justice Marshall's principle that state law ordinarily does not
apply in Indian country,1°9 understood that it was relegating the non-Indian seller
to tribal court" and was untroubled by this outcome."' In two later cases, both
involving tort actions brought by members against nonmembers for activities in
Indian country, the Court held that Oliphant's flat prohibition against tribal court
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants was inappropriate in the context
of civil cases." 2 The Court reinterpreted Oliphant as based not so much on a flat
federal common law rule (category 2) as driven by the implicitly preemptive
power of federal statutes providing federal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers
who victimize members in Indian country (category 4).1"3 This shift allowed the
Court to conclude that tribal court civil jurisdiction over nonmember defendants
was not automatically foreclosed by federal law. 1 4  The Court required the
nonmember defendants to exhaust all tribal court remedies before seeking federal
court relief on the argument that the tribal court was somehow exceeding the
authority allowed it under federal law." 5
For a decade, these cases seemed to fall into a third category (in addition to
tribal criminal and tribal civil-regulatory jurisdiction), that of tribal court civil
jurisdiction.' 6 For it makes little sense to require nonmember defendants to
exhaust all tribal court remedies unless the tribal courts would, in the end, often
have jurisdiction. Strongly reinforcing this surmise was language in the second of
these two cases, which stated that "[t]ribal authority over the activities of non-
Indians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty. Civil
jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless
108. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
109. See text accompanying supra note 78.
110. Federal jurisdiction was not possible because there was no diversity of citizenship and no federal
question involved.
111. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 222-23 (noting that defendant was consensually on the reservation and
had entered into the transaction there).
112. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987); Natl. Farmers Union Ins. Companies v.
Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
113. See Natl. Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 854-55.
114. Id. at 852-54.
115. Id. at 857.
116. The cases held out the important possibility that the tribal courts could become the effective,
legitimating linkage between other tribal institutions and tribal members, on the one hand, and the
broader legal system on the other. See Frank Pommersheim, Braid of Feathers: American Indian Law
and Contemporary Tribal Life 50, 57, 81, 93, 96-98, 194 (U. Cal. Press 1995).
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affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute."1"7 Yet the
Court never explained why tribal court civil jurisdiction over nonmembers was
presumptively proper while tribal council civil regulatory jurisdiction over them
was presumptively improper under Montana. Obviously, when a tribal court
imposes tribal common law or tribal statutory law to resolve a case before it, it is
applying tribal regulatory power. Why the tribal courts are more trustworthy in
doing this than a tribal council was left unsaid, especially since the tribal court
would presumably sometimes be applying rules of law developed by the tribal
council and hearing nonmember challenges to tribal council actions.
So it was inevitable that a collision between the Montana line of cases and
the tribal court civil jurisdictional cases would occur. When it did, in Strate v. A-i
Contractors,'8 the Court again was faced with such chaotic precedent that it could
do essentially anything it wished. It chose to apply Montana to tribal court as well
as tribal council jurisdiction over nonmembers by understanding the earlier tribal
court cases as requiring only the exhaustion of tribal remedies, not as recognizing
presumptive tribal court jurisdiction." 9
At least Strate maintained Montana's attempted connection to context. The
auto accident involving a nonmember defendant in Strate occurred on a public
highway. 120 Thus, it occurred outside tribal lands, and tribal court jurisdiction was
arguably inconsistent with Montana's teachings. This understanding of the
relationship of land ownership and tribal authority is also consistent with the later
decision in Atkinson Trading Company. Yet a month after Atkinson Trading
Company, in Nevada v. Hicks,2 ' the Court reinterpreted Montana in a particularly
aggressive and acontextual way to deny tribal court civil jurisdiction over an
alleged tort that occurred on Indian land.
Hicks involved the execution of search warrants by state and tribal officials
at the home of a tribal member who was suspected of having evidence of off-
reservation illegal activity there. 22 The Supreme Court held that the tribal court
could not entertain a tort action brought by the tribal member against the state
officers, alleging that the officers had exceeded the scope of the warrant and had
improperly damaged the tribal member's property.1 23 Surely the outcome was
driven largely by contextual concerns: a tribal court might seem to be an unfair
forum in which state officers must defend themselves, and presumably both the
federal courts and state courts would be open to hear the controversy. Indeed,
some language in the opinions in Hicks stressed the concern that allowing tribal
117. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 18.
118. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
119. Id. at 453.
120. Id. at 442.
121. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
122. Id. at 356.
123. Id. at 374.
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court jurisdiction (of which there would be no effective federal or state review)
could chill state officers properly enforcing state law violated outside the
reservation, 24 could make reservations enclaves where lawbreakers were
effectively immune from state arrest and prosecution, 125 and could deprive the
Supreme Court and state supreme courts of control over the definition of qualified
immunity for state officers exercising official functions. 126 Justice Scalia's majority
opinion in Hicks can be read as limited to denying tribal courts jurisdiction over
such state officers in such contexts.
Yet the majority opinion in Hicks, especially when read in light of the
separate opinions of Justices Souter'27 and O'Connor,l s seems to reach much
further. Under this broader understanding, Montana now not only controls tribal
court jurisdiction, it applies regardless of whether the cause of action arose outside
tribal lands.129 It is yet to be seen how this reworking of Montana will play out as a
practical matter, 3 ° but suffice it to say it is a radical revision of the longstanding
notion that tribal civil authority was presumptively valid when applied to
nonmembers on Indian lands.
The chaotic combination of context and precedent at the heart of Hicks
suggests that the Justices' wish for greater coherence in the field"3 ' is chimeric at
best. Hicks recalls for me an analogy that I drew over a decade ago, in my first
attempt to analyze federal Indian law. I suggested that federal Indian law is like
the novelist Mark Harris's wonderful card game, TEGWAR: "The Exciting Game
Without Any Rules., 13 2 I continue to think that the analogy is apt, but I was
wrong, or at least too vague, about the culprit. I suggested that the only rule was
'33that "the federal government" always got to deal. The more recent cases
involving tribal authority over nonmembers lack any sort of coherent core, but
that is not the fault of the federal government in general, or of specific
applications of congressional plenary power in particular, or of specific instances
of federal executive action. The problem lies with the Court. In the contemporary
post-Lone Wolf environment, the Court has attributed to itself the task of
incremental decisionmaker, accommodator, contextualizer, balancer of all
interests notwithstanding the incommensurable cross-cultural dynamics. As this
section has demonstrated, it has succeeded only in exacerbating the doctrinal and
124. See id. at 365.
125. See id. at 364.
126. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 373-74.
127. See id. at 375 (Souter, J., concurring).
128. See id. at 387 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
129. Id. at 359-60 (majority opinion).
130. Various Justices opined that it might not require abandoning the results in earlier cases, in that
it creates only a rebuttable presumption against tribal authority over nonmembers on Indian lands, and
the Indian status of the land may be important in how that presumption is applied. See id. at 375-76
(Souter, J., concurring); id. at 395 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
131. See supra n. 25.
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practical problems in the field. In turn, its role is subject to serious institutional
reevaluation, to which the next section turns.
C. Institutional Problems
When read against Chief Justice Marshall's precedents, Lone Wolf
established a clear institutional paradigm: Congress controlled Indian affairs, and
the Court's role was simply to insure that pre-existing tribal rights were not lost
through inadvertent actions by Congress or by the tribes themselves. 34  The
federal-tribal relationship was one of sovereignty and power, not easily amenable
to the rule of law. Complaints of hardship, harshness, and unfairness must be
addressed to Congress, not the courts.
In the abstract, much can be said in defense of the Court's efforts to soften
the regime of Lone Wolf, to domesticate the political relationship so that it
becomes more subject to the rule of law. 31 Perhaps it is not surprising that such
judicial elaborations will end up in a muddled, compromised state, where
longstanding colonial pretensions can be accommodated but not eliminated, and
where the outcomes of cases seem driven by context rather than by clear principle.
After all, this is the land of the common law. Much in our tradition supports
Holmes' point that "[i]t is the merit of the common law that it decides the case
first and determines the principle afterwards"'13 6 and that only over time will the
reconciliation of cases result in "well settled legal doctrine embod[ying] the work
of many minds ... [that] has been tested in form as well as substance by trained
critics whose practical interest it is to resist it at every step.' ' 137 It is possible that
we are in the middle of the transition from ad hoc decisionmaking to reconciling,
generalizing principle and can see only the former clearly while the latter is, at
best, through a glass darkly.
With respect, however, I do not think so. The preceding section
demonstrates, I believe, that in leaving the moorings of the Lone Wolf paradigm
and arrogating to itself a case-by-case role of refereeing disputes in Indian
country, the Court has undertaken a rudderless task for which it is particularly
poorly suited. This doctrinal and practical critique is rooted in a series of
institutional and contextual problems. The Court cannot possibly understand the
dynamics of tribal-nonmember interactions in the multitudinous contexts in which
they arise. The Court can only apply "[t]he felt necessities of the time,"'38 as
134. For more information, review the text accompanying supra notes 70-81.
135. Indeed, many of us in the field have attempted to develop new frameworks for greater judicial
review of congressional actions in Indian affairs. See e.g. Frickey, supra n. 49; Nell Jessup Newton,
Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 195 (1984).
136. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 725, 725
(1931) (reprinting an article originally published in 1870).
137. Id.
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Holmes might say, which include "the prejudices which judges share with their
fellow-men [and women]." '139 It seems particularly troublesome that in recent
years the Court has followed its vision of felt necessities to diminish, not to ratify,
tribal prerogatives.
Consider how the different institutional analysis from the Lone Wolf era
would have resolved the diminishment cases and the disputes concerning tribal
authority over nonmembers in Indian country. Under the work of Chief Justice
Marshall, as seen through the congressional-plenary-power lens of Lone Wolf,
tribes should have prevailed in all the diminishment cases. This is so because,
while Lone Wolf would not prevent Congress from destroying Indian reservation
boundaries, the Marshall interpretive approach would allow this to happen only if
Congress had clearly considered the precise issue in question and had squarely
resolved it. As discussed earlier,140 the Court in Solem persuasively demonstrated
that no such clear congressional resolution concerning reservation boundaries
occurred in the usual allotment statute. It is only because of the Court's decision
to abandon that paradigm in favor of a case-by-case contextual inquiry about
whether the area has retained its Indian character that the tribes have lost many of
the diminishment cases.
Why would the Court abandon a relatively stable and clear paradigm and
undertake such a tortured case-by-case role? It seems apparent that the Court has
been motivated primarily by two practical factors: a desire to protect nonmembers
from tribal regulation (by excluding regions with lots of nonmembers from the
reservation), and a desire to allow states and their subdivisions to administer
public services efficiently, especially where nonmembers are the beneficiaries of
these services. Rather than relegate these nonmembers and their governments to
negotiating with the tribes or beseeching Congress for relief, the Court has
stepped into what it sees as a legal void and tried to resolve the disputes in a
rough-and-ready manner.
The impetus for this judicial solicitude-to undercut tribal prerogatives as
against those of nonmembers and states-seems at least much more normatively
controversial than the Court has openly deliberated. The application of this
judicial solicitude has been ad hoc. The institutional effects of this judicial
solicitude have been to short-circuit processes that might well have led to more
sensible local resolutions of the contextual problems from the standpoint of all
interests concerned. More broadly, from the standpoint of the separation of
powers, the Court has moved from a regime of congressional plenary power to
what I have called "a common law for our age of colonialism,"'' 41 in which the
Court itself has become the primary federal decisionmaker determining when
139. Id.
140. For more information, review the text accompanying supra notes 51-58.
141. See Frickey, supra n. 21, at 58.
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tribal prerogatives must be sacrificed in the face of the perceived contemporary
needs of the broader American society.
Precisely the same set of conclusions applies to the cases involving tribal
authority to regulate nonmembers found in Indian country. As Oliphant
recognized, the tribe in question had not ceded that authority, nor had Congress
clearly abrogated it. 141 Yet the disastrous demographic context of Oliphant
seemingly cried for judicial intervention-or did it? On the one hand, it seems
odd to think that a tribe with fifty resident members should be able to incarcerate
any of the 3,000 nonmembers who live on the reservation. Yet the institutional
perspective, along with a deeper contextual understanding, mutes this problem at
least to some extent.
First, the legal regime in place before Oliphant provided substantial
protections to nonmember criminal defendants in tribal court. Had the tribe been
allowed to prosecute Oliphant, ICRA would have required the tribe to accord him
with most of the protections he would have received in federal or state court.143
To be sure, the similarities are not seamless: for example, an all-Indian jury would
have been allowed, a matter the Court specifically remarked upon.1" Yet ICRA
also contained an important limitation not found in the Constitution: it limited
punishment to a maximum of six-months' imprisonment or a fine of $500.145
146ICRA also expressly provided for habeas corpus review in federal court, so that
any abuses in the tribal court could be rectified.
Second, Oliphant was not some outsider without any reservation contacts or
situation sense. He lived on the reservation, and he supposedly committed a clear
breach of the peace by assaulting a tribal police officer.'47 Any requirements of
jurisdictional due process-of minimum contacts and legitimate jurisdictional
motivation-would seem easily satisfied.
Third, Oliphant was not some powerless person standing in pitiful anonymity
against the exercise of the coercive power of a foreign sovereign. To be sure, he
was not a member of the tribe and had no vote in tribal affairs. He did have a
powerful champion in the case, however: Slade Gorton, then the Attorney
General of Washington and later a United States Senator. It was Gorton himself
who argued on behalf of the state of Washington as amicus curiae that Oliphant
should be free from tribal authority.
4 8
In light of these factors, consider what might have happened if the Court had
allowed the tribe to prosecute. Had fundamental unfairness occurred, a federal
142. For more information, review the text accompanying supra note 89.
143. For more information, review supra note 98.
144. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194.
145. See id. at 203 n. 14 (describing this limitation). Later the statute was amended to authorize
tribal punishments of up to one year in jail and a $5,000 fine. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
146. See 25 U.S.C. § 1303.
147. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194.
148. See id. at 191.
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court, through habeas corpus, could have remedied it. Moreover, Gorton and
other opponents of tribal power would surely have pressed Congress for
legislation altering the Court's result.
In the final analysis, the Court in Oliphant did not fully balance the long-
term likelihood of harm in tribal jurisdiction against the consequences of allowing
that jurisdiction to proceed. I remain convinced that the Court incorrectly
abandoned its longstanding institutional role of deferring to the congressional
power over Indian affairs by abstaining from common law making in federal
Indian law that would undercut tribal authority. It preempted what would likely
have been some sort of political solution-indeed, perhaps many localized
political solutions. Instead, it embarked on an agonizing, case-by-case process that
likely has proved to be anathema to all parties concerned and that surely has been
a time-consuming, frustrating, and unrewarding series of events for the Justices
themselves.
Of course, these decisions on tribal power are "only" federal common law, so
Congress may alter them. 4 9 Nonetheless, by turning off the political pressure
from nonmembers and their state and local governments, the Court has shifted the
burden of legislative inertia from where it would have belonged and imposed it
upon the tribes. It is elementary that it is much easier to kill proposed legislation
than to pass it.150 Although generalizations are treacherous, the political facts of
Oliphant suggest that nonmembers, bolstered by state and local officials, would
have more capacity than tribes to move Congress to enact legislation and,
especially, to block legislation that would restore tribal prerogatives. That the
Court has reworked the practical political dynamics in this fashion is especially
remarkable in light of the many precedents that portray the supposed political
weakness and unsophistication of Indians as a primary justification for the federal-
tribal trust relationship and the special canons of interpretation. 5'
149. Or can it? Following Duro, Congress passed legislation overturning the decision by recognizing
inherent tribal sovereignty to apply criminal jurisdiction to nonmember Indians. See 25 U.S.C. §
1301(2) (2000). The statute was drafted in this manner to immunize tribal prosecutions from the
argument that they involved delegated federal authority (instead of inherent tribal power) and thus
were subject to the Constitution. In a stunning decision, the Eighth Circuit held that Congress had no
authority to acknowledge inherent tribal power, viewing the definition of tribal authority as a judicial,
not congressional, question. See U.S. v. Weaselhead, 156 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 1998). (What in the world
has become of the congressional plenary power over Indian affairs?) Judge Morris Arnold's dissent,
which is surely correct, argued that Duro was simply a federal common law decision that Congress
could override by ordinary legislation. See id. at 825. The issue divided the en banc Eighth Circuit
down the middle, resulting in a per curiam reinstatement of the district court's opinion, which had
followed the same tack as Judge Arnold later took. See U.S. v. Weaselhead, 165 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir.
1999) (en banc), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 829 (1999). In a more recent case, the Ninth Circuit has agreed
with Judge Arnold. U.S. v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 925
(2002).
150. See e.g. Kay Lehman Schlozman & John T. Tierney, Organized Interests and American
Democracy 314-15, 395-96, 398 (Harpercollins College Div. 1986).
151. See e.g. Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930) (In applying the favorable canons of
interpretation, the Court wrote: "Such provisions are to be liberally construed. Doubtful expressions
are to be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation,
dependent upon its protection and good faith.").
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In summary, Lone Wolf, as read against Chief Justice Marshall's earlier cases
developing an interpretive paradigm, allowed Congress to call the shots in federal
Indian policy so long as it acted clearly. Federal Indian policy was political, largely
beyond the rule of law. The Court has eroded all aspects of this paradigm. By
bringing the field somewhat under the rule of law, the Court has sometimes helped
tribes (a muddled conception of Indian property, which is sometimes protected by
the Fifth Amendment, is surely more normatively defensible than allowing
Congress to confiscate Indian property without constraint so long as Congress
operates clearly). But the Court's sense that it can find justice on a case-by-case
basis has often been invoked to undermine tribes, not help them. Most
fundamentally, it has elevated the Court into the role as arguably our most
powerful contemporary agent of an ongoing, evolving colonialism. This method is
contrary to the foundational approach to the field taken by Chief Justice Marshall,
who saw a necessary judicial role in ratifying the original premises of colonialism
but considered the courts to be free to put up barriers to further encroachments
upon tribes and viewed negotiation or congressional policymaking superior to
judicial undermining of tribal prerogatives.152
D. The Academic Quandary
In light of the foregoing, it is not surprising that perusing recent federal
Indian law scholarship is much like reading a transcript of a group therapy session
for masochists afflicted with an inferiority complex. Scholars rail-perhaps a
better word for it is flail-against the trend in the cases, in which the tribes'
batting average in the Supreme Court is so dismal 53 that, we are told, experienced
practitioners now advise tribes to avoid the Supreme Court at all costs. We
complain that the Court has lost the sense of prior precedential understandings
under which it was supposed to protect pre-existing tribal interests as against all
but crystal-clear congressional intrusions. We demonstrate that the doctrinal
aspects of federal Indian law are a mess. We recognize that the current
reservation context is itself sometimes a maze of mixed land ownership patterns
that makes the delivery of government services a nightmare. Some of us suggest
that all this is beyond the Court's ken-that doing best would be doing nothing
other than freezing the status quo and requiring further legal and social evolution
to come through a dialogue among the tribes, Congress, state and local
governments, and nonmembers who have legitimate interests in Indian country.
As the years have gone by, the jurisprudential spread between the Court and the
scholarly community has become a gulf that now may be impassible.
Of course, federal Indian law is not unique in this regard. It probably goes
without saying that the notion that constitutional and civil rights law will ordinarily
152. See Frickey, supra n. 4, at 388-89.
153. See Getches, supra n. 28.
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unfold, in common-law-like fashion, in a largely progressive and functional
direction to promote a better balance of freedom, equality, and governmental
responsibility has collapsed. Of the many examples in which the progressive
scholarly community is at odds with today's Court, perhaps the area involving a
series of cases most illustrative of this disjunction involves the dispute about
congressional authority to impose civil rights measures upon unwilling state
governments. 154 Even more acute, though, has been the scholarly anguish over the
Court's resolution of the 2000 presidential election. 55
As my colleague Robert Post has explained, Bush v. Gore"' presents a
unique challenge to many of us. The decision seems not just merely quite wrong
both doctrinally and politically. Disturbingly, it seems so brutally result-oriented
as to disqualify itself from the legitimating label "law"-so narrowly written as to
apply only to its precise facts and to no analogous circumstances, so unlikely to
recur that the Court will never need to reconcile cases and thereby make, in
Holmesian fashion, a "true induction to state the principle which has until then
been obscurely felt," much less eventually work such a mid-level generalization
against even later cases to develop "the abstracted general rule. 1 58 Instead, the
case seems to epitomize what Justice Roberts once suggested was the
paradigmatic abuse of judicial power, when a case falls "into the same class as a
restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only.'
' 59
Larry Kramer has eloquently argued that the disdain shown for political
rather than judicial solutions in Bush v. Gore is not unique.' 60 In his judgment, the
current Court has frequently displaced the political process and imposed the
Justices' own sense of situational justice.161  Understandably, given the status and
154. See e.g. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination
Legislation after Morrison and Kimel, 110 Yale L.J. 441 (2000).
155. See e.g. Bush v. Gore: The Question of Legitimacy (Bruce Ackerman ed., Yale U. Press 2002); A
Badly Flawed Election: Debating Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court, and American Democracy (Ronald
Dworkin ed., New Press 2002); The Vote: Bush, Gore and the Supreme Court (Cass R. Sunstein &
Richard A. Epstein eds., U. Chic. Press 2001); Symposium, Votes and Voices: Reevaluations in the
Aftermath of the 2000 Presidential Election, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 1145 (2002).
156. See Robert Post, Sustaining the Premise of Legality: Learning to Live with Bush v. Gore, in Bush
v. Gore: The Question of Legitimacy, supra n. 155, at 96-109.
157. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
158. Holmes, supra n. 136, at 725.
159. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting). I am not the first to make
this analogy to Bush v. Gore. See e.g. Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, in The Vote: Bush, Gore
and the Supreme Court, supra n. 155, at 70; Michael Herz, The Supreme Court in Real Time: Haste,
Waste, and Bush v. Gore, 35 Akron L. Rev. 185, 194 (2002).
160. See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115 Harv. L.
Rev. 4 (2001).
161. Other commentators have seen Bush v. Gore as symptomatic of a broader problem of overly
aggressive judicial intervention in cases raising constitutional objections to the regulation of politics
itself, such as regulation of political parties. See e.g. Elizabeth Garrett, Is the Party Over? The Court
and the Political Process, 2002 S. Ct. Rev. - (forthcoming 2003). See generally Michael C. Dorf &
Samuel Issacharoff, Can Process Theory Constrain Courts?, 72 U. Colo. L. Rev. 923 (2001) (discussing
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opaqueness of federal Indian law, his article does not consider that field. Those of
us in this field would, I think, invite the comparison. Kramer's criticism fits
federal Indian law to a T: the Court has micromanaged the field, largely out of a
vague sense of justice, and thereby displaced political resolutions of the issues that
would have almost certainly been more productive."' So if I may be so arrogant
as to speak for my colleagues in federal Indian law to my other colleagues in the
general public law: take it from one with a foot in both fields, you should come on
over, there is plenty of malaise to go around.163
IV. CONCLUSION
In announcing an unreviewable congressional authority over Indian affairs,
Lone Wolf expressed a drastic vision of colonialism. At first blush, it would seem
that any sort of demise of this doctrine would be an unalloyed progressive
measure. But there are many ways to modify a precedent. The Court's gradual,
incremental displacement of the political process in Indian affairs with judicial ad
hoc judgments has had the effect of an ongoing judicial colonial management
program, not a progressive counterweight to historical and current colonial
pretensions. It is as if the Court views Congress as having shirked its responsibility
to manage colonial affairs, thereby leaving the Court the thankless responsibility
of filling the breach on a case-by-case basis.164
In Bush v. Gore, the majority of the Court expressed a similar instinct:
"When contending parties invoke the process of the courts.... it becomes our
unsought responsibility to resolve the federal and constitutional issues the judicial
system has been forced to confront. 1 65 It is hard to take this view seriously as a
general matter in light of such factors as the discretionary certiorari process. In
any event, in the context of federal Indian law, it seems clear that the Court's
recent decisions amount to unforced errors, not thankless tasks.
In the final analysis, the Justices in federal Indian law would profit from
heeding the wisdom of two analysts who became famous in Yankee surroundings,
the B & B boys-Berra and Bickel. Yogi counseled that "[y]ou got to be very
162. In his thoughtful book, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton U. Press 1999),
Mark Tushnet contends that judicial review has generally had a negative impact upon progressive
politics.
163. The malaise extends to teaching federal Indian law as well. Post laments the challenge of
teaching Bush v. Gore to students already prone to avoid the hard work of improving their legal
analytical skills by the easy out of political explanation. See Post, supra n. 156, at 97-98. A similar
challenge runs through much of the corpus of federal Indian law. Federal Indian law does have one
advantage over some other areas of public law, however, in that the often stronger relationship
between theory and practice makes it possible to contribute to practical solutions in the real world even
if the theoretical aspects of the venture are distressing. See supra n. 37.
164. See Frickey, supra n. 21, at 68 (analogy to dormant Commerce Clause).
165. 531 U.S. at 111.
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careful if you don't know where you're going, because you might not get there.'
166
In such circumstances, Alexander suggested, the prudent course is sometimes the
passive one, doing nothing at all. 167 A Bickelian twist on a Berraism counsels that,
when the Court next comes to a fork in the road in federal Indian law, it should
not take it. 168
166. See Famous Yogi Berra Quotes <http://www.yogiberraclassic.org/quotes.htm> (accessed Sept.
20, 2002).
167. The reference, of course, is to Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword:
The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1961).
168. Cf. Famous Yogi Berra Quotes, supra n. 166 ("When you come to a fork in the road, take it!").
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